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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 10-4779
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ALFRED STEWART,
Appellant
__________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 1:10-cr-00085)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
__________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 10, 2012
Before: SLOVITER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District Judge*
(Filed: February 23, 2012)
_____________
OPINION
_____________
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
Alfred Stewart pleaded guilty in the Middle District of Pennsylvania to possession
with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Stewart was a
*

The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
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career offender under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”), resulting in a total
offense level of 29 and a criminal history category VI, producing an advisory sentencing
guideline range of 151 to 188 months. Stewart objected to the career offender
designation and moved for a downward departure of one criminal history category under
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1). The District Court denied the motion for downward departure,
but granted a variance based on pertinent 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, ultimately
sentencing Stewart to 110 months’ imprisonment.
Stewart has appealed his sentence, asserting that the District Court erred by
denying the departure motion and that he received a substantively unreasonable sentence
despite the 41-month variance below the minimum prison term in the applicable
guideline range. We reject these arguments and will affirm.1
I.
We generally do not review the denial of discretionary departure motions. See
United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 839 (3d Cir. 2006) (“courts of appeals . . . have
no authority to review discretionary denials of departure motions in calculating
sentencing ranges”). An exception exists if the “District Court refused such a departure
in violation of law.” United States v. Batista, 483 F.3d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 2007). If the
District Court properly understood its authority to grant a departure, we lack jurisdiction
to review the denial of a request for downward departure. Id.

1

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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The record reveals that the District Court clearly understood its authority to grant
the U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 departure. The District Court adhered to the proper three-step
sentencing procedure by calculating the advisory sentencing guideline range, ruling on
the departure motion, and considering the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United
States v. Gunter 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). In denying Stewart’s departure
motion, the District Court articulated its reasons on the record why Stewart’s criminal
history prohibited him from receiving a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3.
This serves as clear proof that the District Court was aware of its authority to depart.
Therefore, we lack authority to review Stewart’s challenge to the denial of his departure
motion.
II.
A challenge to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We will
not reverse a procedurally sound sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing court would
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the District
Court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
Because a sentence within the guideline range may be presumed reasonable, see Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007), it is exceedingly difficult for a defendant to
demonstrate that the benefit given by a below guideline range sentence is unreasonable.
See United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A] within-guidelines
range sentence is more likely to be reasonable than one that lies outside the advisory
guidelines range.”).
3

The District Court properly calculated the guideline range, then proceeded to
consider the U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 downward departure motion and § 3553(a) factors when
fashioning Stewart’s 41 month below-guideline range sentence. The District Court
considered Stewart’s role as a street-level dealer, the dates and weights of the drugs sold,
the circumstances of his prior criminal history, and his cooperation with the authorities.
Nevertheless, Stewart complains that the District Court gave too much weight to the
career offender guideline. The argument is unavailing. Stewart is a recidivist with a
prior criminal record that began at the age of thirteen and continued unabated through the
instant offense of conviction. Stewart’s record is comprised of multiple drug convictions,
one of which included a firearm, a resisting arrest conviction, and a series of probation
and parole violations. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by varying 41
months below the guideline range and in no way imposed an unreasonable sentence.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence imposed by the
District Court.
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